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The paper considers the relationship between the willingness to pay for environmental 
quality and averting expenditures-that is, the costs of measures undertaken in efforts to 
counteract the consequences of pollution. The models used assume perfect mobility among 
locations with different levels of environmental quality. The major results are: (I) Averting 
expenditures are not in general a good measure of willingness to pay; (2) averting expenditures 
are not always even a lower bound on willingness to pay; (3) even when averting expenditures 
are a lower bound, the difference between the level of such expenditures and willingness to pay 
carmot be attributed to the unavertible “aesthetic” consequences of pollution. 
For almost every kind of environmental unpleasantness we face, there are averting 
expenditures we can make to reduce, and sometimes completely remove, the damage. 
For air pollution, house paint, air conditioners, soap; for water pollution, wells, 
bottled water, purifiers; for noise pollution, storm windows, thicker walls. Economists 
have long been aware that averting behavior is both possible and practiced, and they 
have often suggested that expenditures on such behavior can be used as a measure of 
the costs imposed on society by various forms of pollution. The literature on this 
subject is difficult to characterize, but to the extent that a consensus has been 
reached, it is that averting expenditures provide a lower bound estimate of the total 
costs imposed by pollution, and the divergence between averting expenditures and 
the total costs of pollution arises from the fact that some consequences of pollution 
(e.g., the simple unpleasantness of breathing dirty air) cannot be averted.2, 3 
In this note we develop two simple models of the response of utility maximizing 
consumers to small changes in the level of pollution which they face. In the first 
model, we assume that environmental quality is desired solely because it reduces the 
need for averting expenditure; we show that: (1) the level of averting expenditure 
may be either a lower bound or an upper bound estimate of the consumer’s 
‘We are grateful to T. C. Bergstrom, D. L. Rubinfeld, H. R. Varian, and the referees for comments on 
earlier drafts. 
*See, for example, [l3, p. 91; 5, p. 127; 4, p. 77; I, p. 178; 7, p. 32; 14, p. 175, Appendix B; 9, p. 1461. 
‘There is another literature, exemplified by the work of K.-G. M&ler, [IO, pp. lO6- 1181, which 
considers expenditures on private goods made in order to abet the benefits of a public environmental 
good. Although the analysis is formally similar, we prefer to stress averting expenditure because few 
people believe abetting expenditures to be a good measure of willingness to pay for public environmental 
goods (see, for example, [8, p. 4541). 
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willingness to pay for less pollution, depending on the properties of the technology 
under which averting expenditure achieves its purpose; and (2) there is no assurance 
that averting expenditure will be a good approximation of willingness to pay. In the 
second model, we go on to consider a case where environmental quality directly 
affects consumer well-being, and hence where some of the costs of pollution cannot 
be averted through private expenditure; we show that knowledge of the production 
function for averting behavior is no longer sufficient to determine whether the level 
of averting expenditure is an upper bound or lower bound estimate of willingness to 
pay. Then, specific information on the properties of the utility function as well as the 
production function is required if we are to use the averting expenditure to put 
bounds on the willingness to pay. 
THE FIRST MODEL 
For simplicity, we consider a world in which there is only one environmental 
amenity, air quality (A), and one kind of averting behavior, the use of soap (S). The 
private good, soap, and the public good, air quality, together produce cleanliness (C) 
by means of a known technology, concave and increasing in each argument, 
c = c(s, A). (1) 
Otherwise identical consumers face different air qualities in different locations and 
maximize utility by allocation of personal income (Y) between the purchase of soap 
and a composite consumption good (X). (Units of both soap and the consumption 
good are chosen so that they have prices of unity.) In this first model, pollution 
affects utility only through its effect on the cost of cleanliness; air quality does not 
enter directly into the utility function, and the utility function is given by 
u= u(c, x), (2) 
where (2) is increasing in each argument.4 
It is assumed that all locations are open to migration. This assumption and the 
assumption that all consumers are identical imply that the level of utility achieved 
must be the same in all locations when the system is in equilibrium. In more 
complicated models (e.g., Polinsky and Rubinfeld, [ 1 l]), migration would assure that 
the advantages of locations with cleaner air would be compensated for by differences 
in prices, incomes, property values, and/or congestion. In our simple models, all of 
these forces are proxied by differences in income. The willingness to pay for 
marginal improvement in the level of air quality (dA > 0) is defined as the decline in 
income (dY) that would leave utility constant. 
We start with the simple case where the production function for cleanliness is such 
that the marginal product of soap is increasing in air quality but constant for a given 
air quality (C,, > 0 and C,, = 0, where the subscripts indicate second partial 
derivatives). In this case, the cost of a unit of cleanliness depends only on A, and at 
4The assumptions made about (1) and (2) imply that any level of C can be achieved at any level of A. 
In this sense, all consequences of pollution are “avertible.” The case where some consequences of 
pollution are not avertible is dealt with in the second model, in the next section. There, the utility function 
will be given by L/ = U( C, X, A). 
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any given level of A a consumer may buy cleanliness at constant cost, P(A). Since 
the consumer is maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint and parametric 
prices, the maximization problem may be analyzed by looking at the indirect utility 
function.5 
v= V(Y, P(A)). (3) 
Now we consider the effect of a marginal change in air quality on such a consumer.6 
The condition for locational equilibrium requires that 




dY av/ap dP -x...---.- 
dd4 av/ar dx (5) 
By a well-known property of the indirect utility function, we know that 
atyap c --1 
av/ar 7 





In words, the improvement in air quality lowers the price of cleanliness, and thereby 
lowers the cost of buying the consumer’s previously chosen level of cleanliness. This 
cost is reduced by the amount, C(dP/dA), the right side of Eq. (7). After migration 
has restored the equality of utility among cities, income must have fallen by exactly 
this reduced cost. This income decline is precisely the measure of the consumer’s 
willingness to pay for the improved air quality defined above, since it is that decline 
which just equalizes utility among cities of different air qualities. Thus, the benefit of 
a marginal reduction in air pollution (the willingness to pay) is correctly measured 
by the reduction in the expenditure the consumer would have to make to achieve the 
same level of cleanliness as he achieved before. 
The observed change in the consumer’s expenditure on averting behavior is not the 
same thing, since the amount of cleanliness purchased will increase in response to 
the lower price. The averting expenditure (E) equals P . C, and its change in 
response to a change in air quality is 
5See [15]. 
6More precisely, we consider the effect of a consumer’s costless move to a different location with a 
slightly different air quality. We assume that the distribution by air quality of locations, or “cities,” is 
given and unchanging. Were air quality to change in any one location, there would be a small change in 
the uniform level of utility by all consumers. See [3] for a discussion of how the uniform level of utility 
changes in response to a change in conditions in one location. 
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FIGURE 1 
Note that there are two terms on the right side of (8), the latter of which is equal, in 
absolute value, to the consumer’s willingness to pay for the improvement in air 
quality. The absolute value of the change in averting expenditure (-dE/dA in Eq. 
(8)) will be larger or smaller than the willingness to pay (-dY/& in Eq. (7)) 
according as dC/dA is less than or greater than zero. But an improvement in air 
quality means a reduced price of cleanliness (i.e., dP/dA < 0); since migration 
ensures that the consumer moves along the compensated demand curve (i.e., 
dU/dA = 0), the lower price must induce the purchase of an increased quantity (i.e, 
dC/dA > 0). Therefore, the change in averting expenditure is an underestimate of 
the willingness to pay when air quality improves.7 
While the preceding applies exactly only for marginal changes, its implications for 
nonmarginal changes can be seen diagrammatically. In Fig. 1 is drawn the com- 
pensated demand curve for cleanliness of each of the consumers. If air quality is 
poor (A, ( A,), the price of cleanliness is high (PO > PI) and less is purchased 
(Cc < C,). If the consumer suffering A,, could move to A,, that consumer would be 
willing to pay (according to Eq. (7)) an amount equal to the area marked (Y. But if 
such a locational change were made, we would observe a reduction in averting 
expenditure of the area, (r - /3, which could be positive or negative depending on the 
price elasticity of the demand curve. The people in the cleaner environment may 
actually spend more on cleanliness, even with identical tastes and utility. There may 
not even be a reduction in averting expenditure, but if there is a reduction (i.e., if 
/3 < a), then it will be less than the willingness to pay (i.e., (Y - /? ( a). 
70r, what comes to the same thing, the difference in averting expenditure between two differently 
located but otherwise identical persons is an underestimate of what the person located in the dirtier 
environment would be willing to pay to move to the cleaner location. 
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Thus, if the production function is such that C,, > 0 and C,, = 0, averting 
expenditures provide a lower bound estimate of the willingness to pay. But if the 
demand for cleanliness is not very price-inelastic, the estimate will be a poor one; 
indeed, if the demand for cleanliness is price-elastic, the estimate will be of the 
wrong sign. 
Moreover, the fact that averting expenditure yields a lower bound estimate to the 
willingness to pay is in no way attributable to neglect of any unavertible or 
“aesthetic” costs of a poor environment. Environment per se does not enter the 
consumer’s assumed utility function. ’ Nevertheless, the expenditure change is an 
underestimate of willingness to pay. 
We will now show that the results established above hold whenever C,, is positive, 
provided that C,, is nonpositive. In general, the consumer maximizes (2) subject to 
(1) and the budget constraint (Y = X + S). This yields the following first- and 
second-order conditions: 
- u, + UC . c, = 0, (9) 
u xx - 2c, . u,, + c,2 . u,, +- c,, . UC = A -=c 0, 
where subscripts represent first and second partial derivatives. An improvement in 
air quality affects utility as follows: 
dU - = uxg + (-u, + UC * cs,g + u, * c,. 
dA 
The second term on the right side becomes zero again after the consumer adjusts his 
consumption pattern according to (9); and dU/dA becomes zero after migration has 




The willingness to pay for the improvement is therefore C,/C,, and thus depends 
only on the technology by which the consequences of pollution are averted. Note that 
it does not depend at all on tastes (i.e., the utility function). This means that if 
environmental quality does not appear directly in the utility function, one could in 
principle estimate willingness to pay from an estimate of the relevant production 
function. 
The change in averting expenditure is dS/dA, which is readily found by totally 
differentiating (9) and substituting (12) for dY/dA : 
dS c -=-A+ ws . cs.4 - CA * cs&c 
dA cs -C,.A ’ 
The reduction in averting expenditure is simply the negative of (13). 
The decline in the averting expenditure is an overestimate or underestimate of the 
willingness to pay according as 
c, . G/4 - CA . cm 
‘Recall that 0’ = (i(C, A’); A does not enter. 
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FIGURE 2 
is less than or greater than zero. Normally we expect (14) to be positive: C,, is 
nonpositive if there are nonincreasing returns to soap, and most simple production 
functions imply a positive cross-partial-derivative (Cs,). If the expression is positive, 
then the reduction in soap expenditure does provide a lower bound estimate of the 
willingness to pay, and all of the results established above still hold. Note that the 
sign of Cs, has a straightforward economic interpretation. C,, is positive (negative) 
if the marginal product of soap in producing cleanliness is increasing (decreasing) 
with air quality. 
While the lower bound result and the analysis associated with Fig. 1 will be 
correct for any concave production function provided that C,, is positive, there is 
nothing in neoclassical production theory to rule out the possibility that C,, is 
sufficiently negative that (14) is negative.’ Equation (14) will be negative when the 
isocleanliness curves are ever flatter as C and S increase, with A being held constant. 
Further, negativity of (14) implies that maximizing consumers will consume less 
cleanliness (and more X) as air quality increases: 
dC dS 
-= csz+ CA; 
dA 
and, substituting from (13) 
dC -= 
dA 




Such a situation is illustrated in Fig. 2. An increase in air quality, from A, to A,, 
causes in the end a decrease in both soap expenditure a&d cleanliness, from SO to S, 
‘Quick examination shows that this possibility is not precluded by the second order condition (10). 
Indeed, (14) will be negative if A is an “inferior” factor of production (see [2]). 
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and from C,, to C,, respectively. In such a case, the change in soap expenditure, 
So - S,, overstates the willingness to pay for the improved air quality. 
Although Fig. 2 may be unfamiliar, it is not hard to think of realistic examples 
where, between two people who differ only with respect to their environmental 
quality, the one with the less desired environment achieves a higher level of 
cleanliness as a result of extensive averting activities. As the air becomes worse, 
cleaning and painting may become much more intensive; as the water becomes more 
impure, much more elaborate purification systems may be adopted; as litter grows in 
unsightliness, much more frequent pickup may be arranged.” In each case, the 
person whose environment was worse to begin with may well achieve greater 
“cleanliness” after the averting activities are adopted. And if this occurs, the change 
in averting expenditure will provide an upper bound rather than a lower bound 
estimate of willingness to pay.” 
AIR QUALITY IN THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
Thus far, the analysis has applied to cases where all welfare consequences of 
pollution are indirect. We now show that if air quality enters the utility function 
directly, then averting expenditure provides an even less clear estimate of willingness 
to pay, and not necessarily a lower bound even in the case where the indirect utility 
function is an appropriate tool. ‘* Let U = U(C, X, A); the indirect utility function 
becomes V = V( Y, P, A). A change in air quality, in a system of open cities, yields 
dV i3V dY W dP aV _-.- --ay dA +@-~+~=o. d4 (17) 




dA av/ar * (18) 
There are now two elements to the willingness to pay. The first, as before, is that the 
existing level of cleanliness can be more cheaply achieved (i.e., the first term on the 
right side of (18)); and the second, a new term, is that air quality directly affects 
well-being (i.e., the second term on the right side of (18)). Comparison of Eqs. (8) 
and (18) shows that the reduction in averting expenditureI (i.e., - dE/dA) is greater 
or less than the willingness to pay (i.e., -dY/dA) according as 
“On the optimal rate of litter pickup, and its relation to the rate and volume of litter, see [12, 
Appendix 21. 
“Whether this possibility is important in fact is difficult to say. The sparse evidence on averting 
activities is summarized in [4, pp. 44-501. 
“That is, where C,, = 0. 
131f any; recall that dE/dA might increase. 
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The first term on the right side of inequality (19) is surely positive, but the sign of 
the second term depends on the complementarity-substitutability relationships 
among the three elements of the utility function-i.e., among cleanliness (C), air 
quality (A), and other goods (X). 
Thus, we see that two new problems emerge as a result of considering air quality 
as a direct influence on well-being: (1) there are now two elements (rather than, as 
before, one) of divergence between the change in averting expenditure and the 
willingness to pay, making it even less clear in what sense one is an estimate of the 
other; and (2) it is no longer certain that the change in averting expenditure provides 
a lower bound estimate of willingness to pay even with a very simple cleanliness 
production function. With more complicated production functions, the addition of A 
itself (or some unavertible consequence of A) in the utility function will again add to 
the inappropriateness of using averting expenditure as a measure of willingness to 
pay. Information on both the properties of the production function and the 
complementarity-substitutability relationships of the utility function are required to 
determine whether averting expenditure even bounds willingness to pay. There is still 
no reason to believe it to be a good estimate. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The conclusions of all this are negative. Between two differently located but 
otherwise identical individuals, the difference in their averting expenditures may or 
may not be a close estimate of their willingness to pay for the preferred location. It 
may or may not be a lower bound estimate; it may even be an upper bound estimate. 
In a rare excursion beyond preneocolonialism, Kipling asserted the principal result 
(although without proof): “An’ it all goes into the laundry, but it never comes out in 
the wash,. . . .” 
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